During the Supreme Federal Court session on 15 September 2026, Justice Flávio Dino filed a pedido de vista that sparked debate over whether a minister may use the procedural tool to halt a plenary that he deems improperly conducted.
In the heated debate, Dino addressed President Edson Fachin, saying, “Minister Fachin, with all respect, if you do not take a measure, I will request a view.” He later justified the move by claiming the court lacked the conditions to deliberate and that “society is watching something different from the rite the law mandates.”
Procedural framework of the request
Article 134 of the RISTF states that a minister who requests a view must return the case file within 90 days, counted from the publication of the judgment record.
Paragraph 4 suspends this period during recess or collective vacations and admits a single extension of equal length, upon express manifestation of the minister to the president of the respective chamber. Paragraph 5 triggers automatic release of the case after the applicable term expires.
The amendment identified as regimental amendment 58/22 introduced the objective deadline to prevent indefinite suspensions. However, the rule focuses on the temporal dimension, not prescribing the purpose for which a view may be invoked.
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Notably, the article does not require a minister to present a formal justification when requesting a view. This characteristic protects judicial independence by avoiding improper scrutiny of the internal formation of conviction.
When a minister publicly links the request to a need for presidential action rather than to a deeper examination of the case, the factual basis of the request becomes central to the legal analysis.
Presidential authority and functional boundaries
The president’s duties are outlined in article 13, III, which tasks the office with directing the work and presiding over plenary sessions, and article 44, which assigns “police” of the sessions to the president. Article 133 further restricts any minister from speaking without presidential authorization, except for duly granted interjections.
These provisions delineate a clear division: the president manages procedural order, while each minister retains the autonomous right to request additional time for deliberation. The view is intended to allow a judge to form, revise, or deepen understanding of the matter under consideration, not to serve as a tool for controlling the session’s flow.
While the regiment does not provide for presidential discretion to deny a view outright, it does not preclude the president from recording concerns if the request appears to serve a purpose beyond the examination of the case. Such a record could lead to submitting the issue to the collegial body under articles 13, VII and 44.
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In this context, the request by Justice Dino raises a question of functional deviation: does the public association of the view with a demand for presidential action transform the procedural act into an indirect exercise of the president’s police powers?
Interpretive limits of the view
Legal scholars note that the internal regulation distinguishes the minister’s deliberative prerogative from the president’s policing role. It permits a judge to obtain additional time for personal examination, without granting authority to manage the session’s overall flow.
According to the internal rules, the interruption produced by a view applies only to the specific matter under consideration. The plenary continues under the president’s direction, and other judges may maintain their contributions while the requesting minister steps aside.
Potential institutional responses
The president’s powers, as set out in the internal statutes, include directing the work and maintaining order during sessions. The president could record observations if a view appears to serve a function beyond the minister’s individual deliberation.
